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In this article, we develop the revised and short versions of the pseudoscientific 
belief scale through two empirical studies (N = 4154). This revision is motivated by the 
excessive length of the scale, as well as by consistent observations of poor item loadings 
across several studies. Exploratory factor analysis in Study 1 revealed eleven dispensable 
items, resulting in a 19-item revised form, whereas in Study 2 we constructed a short 8-
item form. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed unidimensional factor structures for 
both scales, exhibiting excellent psychometric properties in relation to factor structure, 
item loadings, internal consistency and convergent validity with paranormal beliefs, 
conspiracy theories and need for uniqueness. Whereas the original scale provides reliable 
indices, we encourage the use of these improved versions to measure pseudoscientific 
beliefs in the context of socio-psychological studies. 
  
Key words: Pseudoscientific beliefs scale, pseudoscience, paranormal beliefs, 
conspiracy theories, need for uniqueness. 
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Revised and short versions of the pseudoscientific belief scale 
  
Pseudoscience is usually defined as cognitions involving radical epistemic 
misconduct and science mimicry (Hansson, 2009; Fasce, 2020), with two major forms: 
pseudo-theory promotion and science denial (Hansson, 2017; Fasce & Picó, 2019a). On 
one hand, pseudo-theory promotion is based on complicated doctrinal content, which 
often includes flawed mechanistic explanations and insubstantial conceptual schemes—
for example, morphic fields, German new medicine, cellular memories, and chiropractic. 
On the other hand, science deniers tend to concoct false controversies, motivated by their 
enmity towards a well-established scientific theory—for example, chemophobia and 
denial of climate change, GMOs and vaccination. 
Pseudoscientific movements have received substantial and multidisciplinary 
attention, highlighting their harmful implications and enduring popularity, but also their 
associated social and cognitive variables. Psychological research has positively linked 
anti-scientific beliefs, such as pseudoscience, with authoritarianism (Fasce, Adrián-
Ventura, & Avendaño, 2020), overreliance in intuitive thinking (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), ontological confusions (Lindeman, Svedholm-
Hakkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015), poor scientific literacy (Fasce & Picó, 2019b), pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koegler & Fugelsang, 2015), 
and causal illusions (Torres, Barberia, & Rodríguez-Ferreiro, 2020). Furthermore, interest 
in pseudoscience has increased in recent times, due to the massive spread of 




The Pseudoscientific Belief Scale (PSEUDO; Fasce & Picó, 2019a) is the first 
validated psychometric tool for the measurement of pseudoscience as a comprehensive 
construct—analogously to what has been done previously in relation to other forms of 
anti-scientific beliefs, such as paranormal and conspiracy theories (Tobacyk, 2004; 
Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). The scale has been successfully used in several 
studies within a wide range of domains, such as the relation of pseudoscientific beliefs to 
scientific literacy (Fasce & Picó, 2019b), authoritarianism (Fasce, Adrián-Ventura, & 
Avendaño, 2020), alternative psychotherapies (Fasce & Adrián-Ventura, 2021), and 
intergroup threat (Fasce, Adrián-Ventura, Lewandowsky, & van der Linden, 2021). 
Due to this intensive and iterative use, we have detected two shortcomings in the 
original scale. Firstly, the original 30-item version may turn out to be too time-consuming 
when data recollection processes involve time constraints. This issue constitutes an 
important limitation for the scientific use of the original scale, especially in studies in 
which pseudoscientific beliefs are an independent variable. Secondly, we have detected 
that some items included in the original scale consistently show weak loadings. In this 
paper, we address these issues by developing a revised version of the scale, eliminating 
poor items, and a short version, based on the most representative of them. For this, we 
report two studies in which we carry out exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, as 
well as assess the convergent validity of the revised and short versions of the scale. 
  
Study 1: Development of the revised form of PSEUDO 
  
For the first study, we recruited a sample of 3183 Spanish-speaking participants 
through social media (Facebook and Twitter), for the online fulfillment of the set of scales 
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via Google Forms. No rewards were offered in exchange and all participants gave their 
informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. 1755 (55%) were men and 1428 
(45%) were women, with an average age of 39.40 (SD = 10.50). 1195 (38%) had pre-
university education and 1988 (62%) had university education. 
Study 1 was aimed at conducting an exploratory factor analysis in order to reduce 
our data variables, producing a revised version of the scale. Thus, for this study we 
included the original 30-item version of PSEUDO (α = 0.89; Likert 1-5; M = 56.75, SD 
= 16.49). 
Construction of the revised form of PSEUDO 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed by IBM SPSS Statistics for 
Windows, Version 25.0 (Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.). Due to the unifactorial nature of the 
original 30-item scale, we suggested a one-factor solution using maximum likelihood 
estimation1. EFA revealed a successful factorial solution and sampling adequacy (KMO 
= 0.94; Bartlett’s sphericity test: χ2 (435) = 26280.50, p < 0.001), explaining 25% of the 
variance. 
Subsequently, item loadings obtained from the EFA were used for the 
development of the revised version of the scale (PSEUDO-R). Meaningful loadings were 
assessed using the following cut-off criteria: 0.32 (poor), 0.45 (fair), 0.55 (good), 0.63 
(very good), and 0.71 (excellent; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). We selected those items 
with a fair factor loading (above 0.45). The resulting scale consisted of 19 items, which 
were tested in subsequent analysis. All these items are displayed in Table 1. The internal 
 
1 Even though we mentioned, at the beginning of this article, the theoretical distinction between pseudo-
theory promotion and science denial, the results obtained by Fasce and Picó (2019a) suggested that, in 
psychological terms, both types of pseudoscience constitute a single factor. This issue was carefully 
analysed in the original validation of PSEUDO. 
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consistency of PSEUDO-R was excellent (α = 0.90; M = 37.37, SD = 13.31), whereas the 
correlation with the original PSEUDO scale was extremely high (r = 0.97, p < 0.001).  
  
Study 2: Testing the factor structure, short version, and convergent validity 
  
For the second study, we recruited a sample composed of 971 Spanish-speaking 
participants through social media (Facebook and Twitter). No rewards were offered in 
exchange and all participants gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the 
study. 576 (59%) were men and 395 (41%) were women, with an average age of 35.32 
(SD = 12.38); 212 (22%) had pre-university education and 759 (78%) had university 
education; 805 (83%) self-identified as non-religious (atheist or agnostic), while 166 
(17%) self-identified as religious (practicing or non-practicing). 
This study was aimed at confirming the factorial structure of the revised version 
of PSEUDO in addition to further develop a reduced, short form. To this end, we used 
the resulting 19-item PSEUDO-R version (α = 0.92; Likert 1-5; M = 37.93, SD = 13.83), 
previously developed in Study 1. Additionally, in order to assess the convergent validity 
of the revised and short versions of the scale, we included a 26-item scale on Paranormal 
Beliefs (Tobacyk, 2004; Likert 1-7; α = 0.94; M = 44.85, SD = 21.97), a 15-item scale on 
Conspiracy Beliefs (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Likert 1-5; α = 0.94; M = 
34.43, SD = 13.91), and a 4-item scale on Need for Uniqueness (Lynn & Harris, 1997; 





Confirmation of the factor structure of PSEUDO-R 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed by means of IBM SPSS 
Amos, Version 23.0 (Chicago, IL: IBM SPSS). Using maximum likelihood estimation, 
we investigated if a unique latent variable (or “factor”) satisfactorily explained the 
variability observed within PSEUDO-R by analyzing the item-factor correlation. For this 
purpose, we took into consideration the most commonly used cut-off values for 
acceptable goodness of fit indices: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI) close to 0.95 or greater, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) close 
to 0.06 or below, and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) close to 0.08 or 
below (Brown, 2015). Although we report the chi-square test, it should be noted that its 
sensitivity to sample size often makes it prone to reject valid models based on the 
detection of any trivial misspecification, thus increasing type II error (Saris, Satorra, & 
van der Veld, 2009)—hence, we address it with caution. 
 The results from the CFA confirmed a one-factor structure for PSEUDO-R, 
analogous to that of the original scale, with excellent f it indices: 𝜒² (124) = 222.26, p < 
0.001; CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.03 (CI: 0.022 - 0.035); SRMR = 0.02. The 





Type of pseudoscience, item contents, means, standard deviations, and item loadings of 
the revised version of the pseudoscientific belief scale. 
Pseudoscience Item content M (SD) Loading 
Body memory All the cells of our body store memories (cellular memories), ours or of our 
ancestors 
2.32 (1.39)  0.66 
Morphic fields The collective memory inherited and shared by the organisms belonging to the same 
species (‘morphic field’ or also ‘morphic resonance’) explains several biological 
phenomena 
2.44 (1.31) 0.64 
Quantum quackery Quantum mechanics has great implications in the explanation of consciousness and/or in 
the treatment of diseases 
2.26 (1.14) 0.61 
Osteopathy and 
chiropractic 
Osteopathy and/or chiropractic are scientifically backed branches of physiotherapy 2.05 (1.18) 0.67 
Reflexology There are areas of our body surface, such as the feet, hands and/or ears in which we 
find representations of our entire anatomy  
1.89 (1.20) 0.80 
Acupuncture The theoretical basis of acupuncture is incongruent with current knowledge about human 
anatomy (R) 
2.25 (1.30) 0.44 
Law of attraction It is a  proven fact that the enthusiastic repetition of desires or asking them to the universe 
(law of attraction) could cause them to come true 
1.36 (0.84) 0.62 
Intelligent design While it is true that evolution is a fact, there are issues that require an intelligent 
intervention to be explained 
1.78 (1.23) 0.65 
Parapsychology It has been scientifically proven that some people have extrasensory abilities (such 
as telepathy or precognition) 
1.56 (0.95) 0.71 
Emotional 
carcinogenesis 
Due to well demonstrated biological reasons, negative emotions and unsolved 
conflicts or traumas increase the probability of having cancer 
1.84 (1.16) 0.66 
Neuro-linguistic 
programming 
Neuro‐linguistic programming (NLP) is accepted as part of psychology  2.41 (1.13) 0.59 
Psychoanalysis The main ideas of psychoanalysis are supported by scientific evidence 2.11 (1.13) 0.56 
Blood type diet Food should be chosen according to the blood group of each person 1.48 (0.87) 0.57 
Pseudocosmetics The use of stem cells and/or DNA improves the effectiveness of facial creams 1.96 (1.09) 0.58 
GMOs opposition GMOs are medically and ecologically safe (R) 2.35 (1.31) 0.56 
Pseudoarcheology There is archaeological evidence of ancient contacts with ‘astronauts’ or ‘space 
visitors’ (for example, in cultures such as Sumerian, Egyptian, Maya or Nazca) 
1.61 (1.03) 0.71 
Magnet therapy It is demonstrated that, in some contexts and cases, being exposed to magnetic fields is 
positive for health 
2.02 (1.14) 0.49 
Chemophobia Many of the pesticides and additives used by the food industry are unsafe 2.95 (1.42) 0.59 
Antivaccination Vaccines are unsafe, some of them cause diseases such as autism 1.28 (0.79) 0.46 
Note: Means, standard deviations, and factor loadings were obtained from the CFA 
conducted in Study 2. All the 19 items included in Study 2 were previously extracted 





Construction of the short version  
On the basis of the CFA described above, we also selected those items with a very 
good factor loading, above 0.63—as described in the widely used cut-off criteria 
established by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007)—, which resulted in a short 8-item version 
of the scale (PSEUDO-S; these items are displayed in bold in Table 1). CFA using 
maximum likelihood estimation also revealed excellent fit indices for the one-factor 
structure in the short form: 𝜒² (11) = 12.77, p = 0.31; CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.99; RMSEA = 
0.01 (CI: 0.000 - 0.037); SRMR = 0.01. Moreover, PSEUDO-S showed good internal 
consistency (α = 0.88; M = 15.50, SD = 7.00) and a very strong correlation with PSEUDO-
R (r = 0.96, p < 0.001). 
Convergent validity 
To assess the convergent validity of PSEUDO-R and PSEUDO-S, we carried out 
three predictions based on well-established background knowledge: 
1) Based on Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, and Chin, (2014), we predicted that 
pseudoscientific beliefs are higher among people self-identified as religious. 
2) Based on Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, and Chin (2014), Lewandowsky, Cook, and 
Lloyd (2018), and Fasce and Picó (2019a), we predicted that pseudoscientific beliefs are 
strongly and positively correlated to other forms of anti-scientific doctrines, such as 
paranormal and conspiracy theories. 
3) Based on previous findings on conspiracy theories (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; 
Lantian, Muller, Nurra, & Douglas, 2017), we predicted that pseudoscientific beliefs are 
weakly and positively related to need for uniqueness. 
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In this third prediction, intended to be riskier than the two previous ones, we 
extrapolated the rationale offered by Imhoff and Lamberty (2017), and Lantian, Muller, 
Nurra, and Douglas (2017) regarding conspiracy theories. Under this in terpretation, as a 
dispositionally high or a situationally enhanced need for uniqueness tend to motivate 
people to agree more with unpopular, minority opinions (e.g., Imhoff & Erb, 2009), these 
individuals would satisfy their desire to be unique, true seekers of hidden, with the 
adoption of a conspiracy worldview. In our view, this theoretical background can be 
extrapolated to pseudoscientific doctrines, which also tend to be presented as “alternative 
knowledge” within highly motivated reference groups (Kahan, 2016)—moreover, the 
prototypical form of intergroup representation that lies at the root of conspiracy theories 
also plays a pivotal role in pseudoscientific doctrines (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014; 
Uscinski, Douglas, & Lewandowsky, 2017). 
  
Table 2 
Correlation matrix between the variables included in Study 2. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
PSEUDO-R - 0.96* 0.69* 0.71* 0.15* 
PSEUDO-S  - 0.70* 0.69* 0.14* 
Paranormal Beliefs   - 0.57* 0.18* 
Conspiracy Beliefs    - 0.14* 
Need for Uniqueness     - 
 
Note: All values survived the Bonferroni correction at the p < 0.05 threshold. * = p < 
0.001 
  
As expected by our first prediction, we found that self -identified religious 
participants (M = 48.83, SD = 12.50) had higher levels of endorsement of pseudoscience 
than non-religious participants (M = 35.68, SD = 12.50), as measured by PSEUDO-R [t 
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(216.15) = -10.69, p < 0.001, d = -0.95; CI: -15.31, -10.99]2. In addition, as can be seen 
from Table 2, correlation analyses conducted in order to test our second and third 
predictions were also in line with our expectations: PSEUDO-R showed to be strongly 
correlated to Paranormal Beliefs (r = 0.69; p < 0.001) and Conspiracy Beliefs (r = 0.71; 
p < 0.001), as well as weakly associated with Need for Uniqueness (r = 0.15; p < 0.001), 
with PSEUDO-S showing an analogous nomological network. These results reveal the 
satisfactory convergent validity of these improved forms of the scale. 
 
 Concluding remarks 
  
We would like to remark on some limitations of the reported results. In the first place, 
both samples were composed by a higher number of university -educated and non-
religious participants, therefore these asymmetries should be taken into consideration in 
the future to assess if they affected our results. In the second place, as the prevalence of 
pseudoscientific beliefs varies from one culture to another (e.g., endorsement of 
intelligent design may be quite low in non-Christian populations, acupuncture belief may 
be held primarily by people from East-Asian countries, etc.), the cross-cultural validity 
of these results should be addressed with caution. Lastly, in the current form of PSEUDO-
R, it cannot discriminate people who intentionally disbelieve in a pseudoscientific 
doctrine from those who disagree because they don't have sufficient knowledge about the 
subject—a limitation shared with the majority of scales on beliefs, derived from asking 
 
2 Besides this predictable socio-demographic difference, using PSEUDO-R, we also found interesting 
exploratory results regarding gender [more pseudoscientific beliefs among women (M = 41.46, SD = 
14.48) than men (M = 35.51, SD = 12.83): t (778.07) = -6.59, p < 0.001, d = -0.43; CI: -7.69, -4.22]; and 
education [more pseudoscientific beliefs among non-university educated participants (M = 41.92, SD = 
13.92) than university-educated participants (M = 36.82, SD = 13.61): t (969) = 4.80, p < 0.001, d = 0.37; 
CI: 3.01, 7.19]. 
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participants' agreement on the specific content. Accordingly, psychologists and social 
scientists using this scale might not implicitly assume that all participants have sufficient 
knowledge of all domains. 
We have developed the revised and short versions of the pseudoscientific belief 
scale through two studies, which exhibit adequate psychometric properties, such as high 
item loadings and internal consistency, as well as proper convergent validity. The main 
advantage of these improved versions lies in their capacity to provide faster measurement 
of pseudoscientific beliefs in social-psychological studies, retaining the positive 
characteristics of the original scale. We recommend the use of these improved versions 
of the scale to other researchers interested in the study of pseudoscientific beliefs.  
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